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Abstract 
This article argues that an engagement with the powerful critical insights of Žižek’s 
theory of ideology and practice of cultural critique is a necessary step for any art 
historical methodology which aims to fully account for a work of art’s function within 
the society of its creation and reception, and to explain how it came to play such a 
role. However, any attempt to situate cultural artefacts within historically contingent 
networks of social relations requires an account of historical change incompatible 
with any formalist or transcendentalist methodology. Moreover, if it is to be of any use 
as an academic discourse, art history must be able to account for the specifities of 
‘art’ as a distinct—but not autonomous—sphere of human activity. It is precisely 
these two issues that a wholesale importation of Žižek’s writing into the domain of art 
history encounters. A solution must be found whereby the critical lessons of Žižek are 
not ‘lost in translation’. In this vein, the present article begins by outlining Žižek’s 
conception of ideology and elucidating the problematic consequences of any 
straightforward application of its parameters as an art historical methodology. It then 
reads the interventions of Jacques Rancière and Judith Butler as providing the 
necessary theoretical tools by which one can construct the possibility of a powerful 
‘Žižekian art history’. 
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Introduction  
Recently, in this journal, the following question was posed: ‘Can We (Still) Be 
Žižekians and Rancièreans?’ (Bolman and Hodgman 2011) Through a comparative 
reading of Slavoj Žižek’s and Jacques Rancière’s politics, Bolman and Hodgman 
concluded that there is more shared ground between the two authors than either of 
them seem to realize, and that Rancière’s politics adds to, rather than refutes, 
Žižek’s. In my own efforts to construct the theoretical terrain upon which it becomes 
possible to practice Žižekian art history, I have found myself asking similar 
questions. Although, in my reading, it is less a case of ‘can’ than ‘must’: as I will 
argue, the clear analytical and hermeneutic power of Žižek’s theory of ideology and 
practice of cultural critique qua methodology for reading art objects and practice 
comes under threat in the encounter with historical contingency. It is Rancière’s 
politicization of the visible as such, his conceptualization of the aesthetic experience 
as potentially active and emancipatory, that enables us to reconcile Žižekian cultural 
critique with art history proper.  
This article will first elucidate Žižek’s theory of ideology, and outline the 
powerful insights it can provide for the discipline of art history. This process is not, 
however, without certain points of tension: Žižek’s fundamental reliance on a minimal 
ahistorical formal framework sits uneasily with the art historical need to 
accommodate contingency and historicity; moreover, Žižek’s treatment of the artistic 
domain as a repository of illustrative examples of his methodology of ideology 
critique in action assigns it a reactive function incompatible with any art historical 
methodology that aspires to be more than history with pictures. This article will then 
go on to consider how the interventions of Judith Butler and Jacques Rancière into 
these moments of tension and seeming untranslatability provide the critical tools for 
a powerful and practical Žižekian art historical methodology. Žižek’s relocation of the 
site of the functioning of ideology to the unconscious, and his assertion of the 
significant role played by the regulation of enjoyment within ideology, when read 
alongside Judith Butler’s healthy scepticism towards certain transcendental 
categories within Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Rancière’s notion of the partage du 
sensible, allow for a nuanced reading of cultural artefacts which balances an 
understanding of the work of art’s social and psychic function within its social reality, 
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that is, in relation to the regulatory action of ideological fantasy, with an awareness of 
its—historically contingent—transformative and emancipatory potential. 
 
Žižek’s theory of ideology 
Žižek broached the subject of ideology in his first English-language book, The 
Sublime Object of Ideology; he developed the themes of his earlier book later in 
works including For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, 
Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, and ‘The 
Spectre of Ideology’, the introduction to an edited volume entitled Mapping Ideology. 
(Žižek 2008c, Žižek 2008a, Žižek 1993, Žižek 1994) The issues raised in these 
pieces continue to be reworked by Žižek across his œuvre, as well as in secondary 
literature from the increasingly expanding field of Žižek studies.1 Žižek 
conceptualizes ideology as a set of representations which constitute social 
subjectivity. These representations exist in conjunction with communal rituals and an 
unconscious social fantasy which conditions the enjoyment of subjects’ participation 
in their political community. By regulating the relationship between the visible and the 
invisible, ideology structures the social reality. (Žižek 1994: 1, García and Sánchez 
2008, Kay 2003: 134) Ideological fantasy provides the subject’s experience of its 
reality as a coherent entity untroubled by socio-economic antagonisms, and effaces 
the exclusions and foreclosures inherent in the constitution of any society.  
The positive symbolic contents of an ideology, the level on which it produces 
meaning, provides the symbolic coordinates for the desire staged in fantasy, consist 
of what Žižek terms ‘floating signifiers’, which acquire consistency by being ‘quilted’ 
through a certain master-signifier. (Žižek 1994: 10, Žižek 2008c: 95, 113) The 
master-signifier ossifies them into a specific formation, the differential relationships 
within which allow the subject to infer meaning, as Žižek says, “every element of a 
given ideological field is part of a series of equivalences”. (Žižek 2008c: 96) It is what 
Lacan terms the point de capiton—the quilting point—“by [means of] which the 
signifier stops the otherwise indefinite sliding of signification”. (Lacan 2007: 681) 
Lacan conceptualizes the point de capiton as a necessary moment of fixity between 
the signifier and the signified which produces the illusion of stable meaning, and 
prevents the subject from slipping into psychosis. (Lacan 1997: 268-269) Žižek’s 
intervention is to transpose the notion of the ‘quilting point’ from the clinical domain 
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into the political: for Žižek, the quilting point functions as a master-signifier which, in 
the process of totalizing a symbolic field, recedes from view, such that it appears 
‘natural’, rather than contingent. Consequently, naturalization (the insistence that a 
particular social meaning is eternal, universal, or natural, rather than particular, 
contingent) is the ideological move par excellence. A crucial step in ideology critique 
is thus to unmask the performative operation of the quilting point/master-signifier, 
which ideology works to conceal, by means of an “anamorphic reading” which 
“enables us to discern the structural inconsistency of an ideological edifice”. (Žižek 
2008c: 109-110, Žižek 2008b: 97) This, however, is by no means sufficient. Drawing 
from Freud’s methodology of dream-analysis, as well as Marx’s critique of political 
economy, Žižek insists that what is really at stake in ideology is form, not content, 
paving the way for a non-representational, anti-descriptivist theory of ideology and a 
disengagement from an exclusive focus on symbolizing activity. 
In contrast to the classic Marxist identification of ideology as an illusion 
producing a false consciousness, Žižek follows Louis Althusser in relocating the 
functioning of ideology to the realm of the unconscious. Žižek argues that ideology 
functions only in so far as it regulates the libidinal investments of its subjects, 
justifying this move by pointing to the clear insufficiency of the notion of false 
consciousness for dealing with contemporary society. Žižek argues that although 
postmodern individuals maintain a cynical distance towards ideologies, they 
nevertheless behave as if they believe in them. Žižek reformulates the classic 
Marxist, ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it’, into “they know that, in their 
activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it”. (Žižek 2008c: 30) It 
is precisely the previously unaccounted for role of enjoyment that accounts for this 
seeming discrepancy. 
For Žižek, every ideology attaches itself to some kernel of jouissance, the 
regulation and organization of which is central to its functioning. (Žižek 2008b: 63, 
Žižek 2005: 1, Žižek 2008c: 140) Following Lacan, Žižek reads jouissance as a Real, 
the paradoxical emergence of pleasure through pain which is always constituted as a 
surplus. Being of the Real, jouissance is radically incompatible with the entry into 
language: it is necessarily foreclosed and displaced from the symbolic in order for it 
to constitute itself. (Lacan 2007: 696-700) Consequently, jouissance returns 
symptomatically in the form of distortions and disturbances, which can be read in the 
process of ideology critique. Desire, for Lacan, is always the desire of the Other, and 
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it thus has a radically intersubjective character; indeed one of the meanings of 
Lacan’s famous ‘il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel’ is that there are no universal 
parameters for desire, but rather each subject must find its own way in learning to 
desire from without. (Lacan 1998: 185, 235, Lacan 2007: 148, 222, 525, 690, Lacan 
1999: 5, note 19, 12, Lacan 1991: 211) 
It is precisely fantasy which constitutes this ‘without’: fantasy “literally ‘teaches 
us how to desire’”. (Žižek 2008b: 7) Where for Lacan fantasy functions as a screen 
against various lacks, for Žižek ideological fantasy works to disavow the traumatic 
impossibility of any harmonious social organization (the Real of class struggle, the 
constitution of a totality can only be achieved by a particular exclusion, that 
antagonism between internal elements is characteristic of any economic modality). 
(Žižek 2008c: 138, Žižek 1994: 22, 184) The desire to cover over this traumatic lack 
is the very motor of ideology. In the same way that Lacanian fantasy enables the 
subject to indulge in a sense of wholeness, so Žižekian ideological fantasy produces 
(the experience of) a rational, totalized ideological system in which the subject can 
invest his enjoyment: through fantasy, “instead of a full rendering of the antagonisms 
which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic Whole”. 
(Žižek 2008b: 5) Thus, fantasy is not a hallucination or an illusion, or a potential 
avenue of escape from reality, but the very stuff of our social reality, “there is no 
reality without its fantasmatic support”. (Žižek 1993: 90) The most important goal of 
Žižekian ideology critique is therefore to determine the ways in which cultural objects 
stage the enjoyment of ideological subjects, and yet potentially expose them to the 
real of jouissance.  
These two domains of ideology, its positive symbolic contents, and underlying 
phantasmic structure, never meet in the course of its normal functioning. The fantasy 
can never be directly elucidated within the ideology’s symbolic coordinates without 
dispelling is effect. It is precisely by introducing a short-circuit between the explicit 
and implicit layers of ideology that Žižek conceptualizes a way out of ideology: the 
performance of a too-literal identification with the symbolic Law, a parodic and literal 
obedience which function to reveal how ineffective the explicit Law becomes when 
no longer supported by fantasy. (Žižek 2008b: 29, Kay 2003: 136) As Žižek says, 
“stick to this letter against the fantasy which sustains it”. (Žižek 2008b: 38) Such a 
behaviour correlates to the Lacanian notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’, the end goal 
of Lacan’s clinical practice whereby the subject’s relationship to desire is 
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fundamentally reoriented: less of a ‘stepping out’ than a recalibration of the ways in 
which the ideological subject experiences enjoyment from his or her participation in 
their political community. (Lacan 1998: 273, Kay 2003: 54, Žižek 1993: 60) Having 
outlined how Žižek would have us think about ideology—as a multi-layered structure 
that exercises regulating control over the processes through which (political) 
meaning is produced and understood, and over the invested enjoyment of it 
subjects—I will now turn to the conceptual and methodological value this notion 
provides for art history, and the concomitant problems involved in extracting this 
value. 
 
The (Hidden) Value of a Žižekian Art History 
Žižek’s theory of ideology impresses upon the art historian the need to look beyond 
the surface-symbolic, the ostensible ‘meaning’ of the art work, how its positive 
symbolic contents were understood in its various historical moments, by means of an 
‘anamorphic reading’, to the structurally separate level upon which it stages the 
libidinal investments of ideological subjects. Moreover, it provides a mechanism for 
comprehending how the regulation of these libidinal investments via the mechanisms 
of ideological fantasy, the space for which is provided within the frame(s) of the art 
work, can sustain a certain political economy and hierarchical socio-economic 
edifice. Ideology, conceptualized in this way is, therefore, an essential conceptual 
tool for an art history which attempts to fully account for a work of art’s, inherently 
and eminently political, socio-psychic functioning within the social reality of those 
who created and consumed it. However, if we wish to follow Žižek closely, access to 
the critical insights promised by the concept of ideology necessarily comes at a 
certain price: the capacity of the artistic sphere to actively operate as more than just 
a reflecting pool for battles fought elsewhere. 
The aesthetic dimension of cultural artefacts (his preferred example typically 
being narrative Hollywood cinema) functions as the ground for Žižek’s practice of 
ideology critique. In providing the screen upon which ideological fantasy plays out, 
films, paintings, and photographs thus provide material evidence for its functioning. 
In treating culture as a politically charged superstructure which frames subjectivity in 
line with strictures of the prevailing ideology, Žižek seemingly assigns it a rather 
conservative function: culture becomes the passive site onto and through which the 
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phantasmic visions which bolster the status quo are projected and experienced. 
Žižek’s conception of revolutionary art and revolutionary politics as two sides of the 
same coin (connected, and yet separated by the structural impossibility of their 
meeting) confirms this suspicion: he goes as far as to state that “revolutionary 
politics and revolutionary art move in different temporalities”.2 (Žižek 2004b: x) In a 
thoroughly Lacanian manner, Žižekian ideology critique acts upon the cultural object, 
revealing how it is structured by Lacanian categories, how it performatively enacts 
the ideologico-political processes set in motion by the subject’s desire for wholeness 
in Self and Other. Nowhere this this methodology best exemplified than in Žižek’s 
‘translation’ of René Magritte’s La Lunette d'approche (1963) into “Lacanese”. (Žižek 
1993: 103) Despite the fact that Žižek advocates an attentiveness to how cultural 
objects function in social struggles, Žižek’s insistence on transcendental, universal 
Lacanian categories seemingly closes off both the possibility for a transformative 
artistic practice with regard to modalities of ideological subjectivity, and an art 
historical methodology which assigns artistic practice a central role in the processes 
of historical change.3  
Žižek’s conception of class struggle, central to his definition of ideology, 
provides a relevant illustration of the problems potentially posed by such a ‘Lacanian’ 
art historical method. Žižek’s treatment of class is intimately related to his application 
of the notion of antagonism. As we have seen, Žižek conceptualizes antagonism as 
the Real of the social, a constitutional and incessant disruption which makes 
harmonious and transparent social organizations impossible, and stimulates the 
drive for a fantasy of wholeness. In line with Laclau, Žižek argues that antagonism is 
a universal condition of disarray which characterizes every identity. (Žižek 2000: 91) 
As a result of the fact that there is no stable identity position, Žižek argues that “there 
is no class relationship”; there is no ‘normal’ way of organizing class relations, all 
class structures will ultimately fail to fix these antagonistic modalities of interclass 
relations. (Žižek 2009c: 295) Each particular class structure or class antagonism is a 
defensive mechanism, designed to cope with the Real of the universal class 
antagonism. Thus, class is not a positively existing entity, but rather a modality of the 
Real.4 In this way, class is the negative whose exclusion is the condition for the 
establishment of a positive order. 
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Such a definition of class antagonism as the real (in a triple sense: Lacanian 
Real, authentic, True) risks falling into the old Marxist trap of essentializing class 
struggle, and dismissing a spectrum of other (gender, sexuality, racial, nationalist, 
and so on) struggles as merely symptomatic epiphenomena of the universal class 
struggle. In his stance against the “[t]heoretical retreat from the problems of 
domination within capitalism”, this seems to be a risk Žižek is willing to take. (Wendy 
Brown quoted in Žižek 2000: 97) He argues that to not posit a universal struggle, to 
declare every universal to be false and thus to argue that there is not one, single, 
totalizing struggle is “precisely not political enough, in so far as it silently pre-
supposes a non-thematized, ‘naturalized’ framework of economic relations”. (Žižek 
2000: 108) Since to dispense with a concept of universality is to secretly privilege 
some and disavow others, Žižek draws from Laclau and Hegel to posit a ‘concrete 
universality’ whereby the universal is reflexively and dialectically determined by its 
particular contents. This theoretical position is indebted to the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony, inherited in modified from Laclau and Mouffe. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 
xii, Mouffe 1979, Sharpe 2004: 7) In this model, universality as such is an empty 
structural component which, when ‘filled out’ by a particular element (one that comes 
to ‘stand in’ for the universal) totalizes the social field such that the constellation of 
signifiers which constitute the social reality acquire meaning in relation to the new 
universal: as Laclau says, “The universal is an empty place, a void which can be 
filled only by the particular”. (Laclau 2000: 58) Following this, Žižek and Laclau both 
agree that politics is the struggle for hegemony, the battle to have a specific 
particular fulfil the function of a universal: the (hegemonic) universal is the site of 
struggle, always at war with itself, and thus, as such, characterized by blockages and 
fissures. The gaps in the universal, that is, universality proper, can be viewed from 
the position of truth from the perspective of the ‘part of no part’ (the particular 
element within the universality that remains outside it).5 Even given this nuanced and 
reflexive understanding of universality, and the role of class as a universal 
antagonism driving ideology, the question of how to integrate variously articulated 
regimes of difference (gender, sexuality, race, etc.) into a methodology of Žižekian 
ideology critique without dismissing them as symptoms of an underlying blockage in 
the class or sexual relationship, that is, maintaining a semblance of historicism vital 
to art history as a discipline, remains. 
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Addressing Žižek’s ‘formalism’ 
Judith Butler has identified this very weakness of Žižek’s approach. (Butler 2011: 
140-159) Butler argues that Žižek’s problematic formalism, his insistence that 
historicism must always rely on a minimal ahistorical formal frame, clearly evident in 
his analysis of class, emerges from the primacy, the “quasi-transcendental” status, 
he, via Lacan, attributes to sexual difference. (Butler 2000a: 143) The most troubling 
consequence of Žižek’s position, for Butler, is that it makes sexual difference 
radically incontestable, unsymbolizable, immune from critical examination, and, as 
such, a bulwark of normativity. (Butler 2000a: 147) Fundamental, transcendental 
sexual difference does not ‘keep to its place’, but rather intrudes onto the social, and 
functions actively and normatively to constrain horizons: “The inevitable vacillation 
between the transcendental and social functioning of the term makes its prescriptive 
function inevitable”. (Butler 2000a: 148) The delineation of the outside of discourse 
by means of an ahistorical, invariable, and prediscursive law, and to “make that law 
function to secure a sexual differential that ontologizes subordination, is an 
‘ideological’ move in a more ancient sense [i.e., a falsity sustaining a particular 
power interest]”. (Butler 2011: 155) She continues,  
That there is always an ‘outside’ and, indeed, a ‘constitutive antagonism’ seems 
right, but to supply the character and content to a law that secures the boarders 
between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of symbolic intelligibility is to preempt the 
specific social and historical analysis that is required, to conflate into ‘one’ law 
the effect of a convergence of many, and to preclude the very possibility of a 
future rearticulation of that boundary which is central to the democratic project 
that Žižek, Laclau, and Mouffe promote. (Butler 2011: 155-156) 
Žižek’s insistence on the Lacanian Real as the limit-point of the social, and of 
the subject, is the means by which he is able to safeguard sexual difference from 
resignification. (Butler 2011: 150-154) As she quite rightly points out, if the subject 
always meets it limit in the same place, there is no historicity to the subject. (Butler 
2000b: 13)  
In attempting to resolve this tension, one is tempted to read Žižek back to 
himself; if, as he says, the “de-politicized naturalization” of a particular postulate is 
the very form of ideology, how are we to productively engage in ideology critique 
attentive to both its social and psychic dimensions, if the very methodology 
employed engages in the self-same ‘de-politicized naturalization’ of a certain 
antagonism? (Žižek 2010: unpaginated) The solution, I argue, is not to dispense with 
 9	  
	  
psychoanalysis in favour of a strictly Foucauldian focus on discourse—on this point I 
am in agreement with both Žižek and Butler—but rather to comprehend the psychic 
domain as one in which the specific and historical formations of the social persist.6 In 
this way, Butler sees the unconscious as “a certain mode in which the unspeakably 
social endures”. (Butler 2000a: 153) She continues  
The unconscious is also an ongoing psychic condition in which norms are 
registered in both normalizing and non-normalizing ways, the postulated site of 
their fortification, their undoing and their perversion, the unpredictable trajectory 
of their appropriation in identifications and disavowals that are not always 
consciously or deliberately performed. (Butler 2000a: 153) 
Investing the unconscious with a social dimension, an active relationship to 
social norms, retains the great analytical insight Žižek’s understanding of ideology 
offers, without relying on an ahistorical conception of the human psyche which, as 
Butler rightly points out, fails to account for a multitude of contemporary family 
formations. (Butler 2000a: 142)  
As a consequence of his ‘formalism’, Butler takes issue with Žižek’s 
methodology of cultural critique, specifically his deployment of examples from 
popular culture which “serve to illustrate various principles of psychic reality without 
ever clarifying the relation between the social example and the psychic example”. 
(Butler 2000a: 157) An example of this remarked upon by Butler is Žižek’s use of the 
motion picture Jaws (1975) to illustrate the action of the point de capiton in Tarrying 
with the Negative. (Žižek 1993: 149) Žižek thus falls back on employing popular 
culture to illustrate a formal point of theory which is true prior to its exemplification, 
and is exemplified only to illustrate an already accomplished truth. On this note, 
Butler accuses Žižek of a misreading of Hegelian universality, which she reads as 
opposed to Kantian formalism in its insistence that universal categories are 
transformed in their particularization. (Butler 2000b: 26) As remarked upon above, 
such a position lacks the explanatory power necessary to account for artistic practice 
which eludes the narrow confines of illustration (the very minimum aim for art history, 
as opposed to history with pictures), and exists in a variable and transformative 
relationship with the politico-ideological world from which it emerged, and within 
which it is consumed. 
Is not Žižek’s notion of the ‘dimension in-between-the-two-frames’, introduced 
in The Fright of Real Tears in 2009, but subsequently oft-repeated, the clearest 
example of the above outlined problem? When approaching Žižek’s position that the 
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pivotal content of a painting resides in the ‘dimension in-between-the-two-frames’ 
(the gap between its physical frame and the invisible frame, implied by the structure 
of the painting), the first thing to consider is how Žižek himself would have us read 
him. As he recounts in The Fright of Real Tears, Žižek first elucidated the notion as a 
“bluff”, a cover for his ignorance of a painting upon which he was asked to comment. 
(Žižek 2009a: 5) His subsequent disappointment that he was taken seriously, that his 
bluff was “[elevated] into a term”, which he found as evidence for a wider apathy 
within contemporary cultural studies, should be contrasted with the—ostensibly quite 
serious—restaging of his ‘bluff’ later in the very same volume. (Žižek 2009a: 6, 130) 
For one who, as a recently published volume on the subject attests, places so much 
theoretical and methodological importance on the joke, with its inherent slippages 
and reversals between the serious and the comic, such a move is surely more than a 
simple oversight (its re-emergence in other works confirms this thought). (Žižek 
2014, Žižek 2009d: 29)  
It is tempting, therefore, to think of this transition as a joke at the expense of the 
reader, the precise content of which is less significant than the character of its 
enumeration. In staging his ostensible intervention into the field of art history in the 
form of a joke, Žižek, intentionally or not, emphasises the formalism of his 
methodology with respect to both. In an identical manner to the way in which he 
approaches cultural artefacts as particular manifestations of a more universal formal 
frame, evidence for an argument articulated independently, Žižek consistently 
identifies in the form of jokes the categories which structure the Lacanian psyche. A 
joke about Shakespeare can, for example, illustrate the decentred Lacanian subject. 
(Žižek 2014: 42) Thus, it is less the specificity of the artwork itself (its positive 
symbolic contents) that is of significance, but rather how it is positioned in relation to 
the invisible frame of ideological fantasy (the frame which enframes reality itself). In 
accounting for the historically specific enunciation of artists articulated within the 
physical frame of the work, Žižek thus relies on its distance from a second, 
ahistorical frame, which enframes this very enunciation. We have thus returned to 
the stultifying notion that ideological fantasy is merely staged in the passive domain 
of culture. Judith Butler’s critique of Lacanian formalism has provided us with the 
terms to articulate the critical distance between the two components in the ‘Žižekian 
art history’ whose possibility we are here attempting to construct. In bridging this 
gap, the political and aesthetic interventions of Jacque Rancière will be crucial. 
 11	  
	  
Rancière’s notion of the partage du sensible (the division or distribution of the 
sensible) will allow us to reconfigure this thorny relationship between art and 
ideology as multi-faceted and multi-directional. 
 
Why we must be Žižekians and Rancièreans  
Rancière’s work on political theory—beginning in the 1990s—emerged out of this 
early historical work, and developed a number of its key themes. In texts such as La 
Mésentente and ‘Ten Theses on Politics’ Rancière outlined his critique of social 
forms and the parameters of his emancipatory political project. (Rancière 1999, 
Rancière 2001) Central to Rancière conception of the function of politics is the 
governance of visibility.7 Consequently, in recent years, aesthetics has become 
central to Rancière’s project; in texts such as Le Partage du sensible: Esthétique et 
politique, Le Destin des Images, Malaise dans l'esthétique, Le spectateur émancipé, 
and Aisthesis: Scènes du régime esthétique de l'art Rancière has outlined a theory 
of emancipatory aesthetics, as well as a historical framework for the development of 
art across its different ‘regimes’. (Rancière 2004, Rancière 2007, Rancière 2009a, 
Rancière 2009b, Rancière 2013) I am primarily concerned here with Rancière’s 
conception of politics and the police in so far as it implies an aesthetic dimension to 
both the logic of domination and the politics of emancipation, and the fundamental 
structural points of connection he identifies between artistic practice and the sphere 
of politics/policing, captured by his notion of the partage du sensible.  
In many ways, Rancière’s expansive notion of the ‘police’ is correlative to the 
role ideology plays in Žižek’s thought. Rancière’s police is not limited to the 
repressive arm of the state responsible for enforcing laws, but includes the governing 
and administrative machinery responsible for the classification of individuals, and 
their apportionment into the various roles within the social edifice, as well as the 
legitimization of these distributions: police orders are the hierarchical social 
formations we encounter every day. The logic of the police is one which counts, 
classifies, distributes, and names bodies; it is less the disciplining of bodies than the 
regulation of their appearing. (Rancière 1999: 28-29) The police order exercises 
control over the domain of perception, regulating who can be legitimately seen, and 
heard, as a political actor (invested with logos), and who is excluded, invisible and 
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inaudible. (Rancière 1999: 1-2) As such, the police is a “symbolic constitution of the 
social”. (Rancière 2001: paragraph 27)  
Politics then, is that which disrupts the smooth functioning of the police 
machine. It is a sudden, surprising democratic explosion in which those excluded 
from the prevailing police order dramatically demonstrate their equality (and by 
consequence the fundamental ‘wrong’ of their exclusion from society), and come into 
being as political subjects.8 (Rancière 1999: ix, 30-31) Politics takes the form of a 
polemical and disputatious disagreement (an enactment of dissensus) upon and 
from within the police, which renegotiates and reconfigures the existing the police 
order into a new form, breaking its tangible configuration. (Rancière 1999: 29, 33, 
61) Thus, what Rancière termed ‘the poor’ in his early historical work, and later came 
to call ‘the-part-of-no-part’ (the sans-part), is brought into being by politics, and 
functions by introducing what Rancière terms a miscount. (Rancière 2001: 
paragraphs 16-17, Rancière 1999: 10-11) The police order, like Žižekian ideological 
fantasy, is characterized by constituting itself as without void or supplement: in 
symbolically constituting the social it erects a (seemingly) self-sufficient and 
enclosed network of meaning and schema of parts (roles, occupations). (Rancière 
2001: paragraphs 27-29) Rancière then, like Žižek, identifies that every social order 
constitutes itself negatively, by means of a specific exclusion which must necessarily 
remain both ‘outside’ and invisible if the illusory wholeness of the social edifice is to 
survive. Indeed, Žižek himself has made mention of Rancière’s notion of the ‘part-of-
no-part’ numerous times. (Žižek 2009b: 54-55, Žižek 2009c: 116, Žižek 2011: 199, 
Žižek 2008d: 221) With the reintroduction of the supplementary sans-part whose 
exclusion from the social forms the condition of possibility for the police, politics 
disrupts the police through the “power of the one more, the power of anyone, which 
confuses the right ordering of policy”. (Rancière 1992: 59) In this precise way, the 
sans-part is excessive.  
As we have seen, control over the aesthetic realm of sense-perception 
characterizes the function of Rancière’s police; likewise, politics disrupts the police 
by introducing the principle of equality and making “visible what has no business 
being seen”, that is, the sans-part. (Rancière 1999: 30) As Rancière says, “[p]olitics 
is first and foremost an intervention upon the visible and the sayable”, a question of 
whether those who are excluded from the existing socio-political order (the sans-
part) can be seen and heard as political subjects voicing meaningful grievances 
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when they seek to contest the order of their domination. (Rancière 2001: paragraph 
29) Thus, a key component of politics is the aesthetic; indeed “politics is aesthetic in 
principle”. (Rancière 1999: 58) Rancière highlights the aesthetic interconnections 
between politics and the police through his complex and multivalent hinge-concept, 
the partage du sensible (the division or distribution of the sensible). 
Rancière understands the partage du sensible as a specific configuration of the 
parameters of sense-perception which governs the domain of visibility, and the 
relations within this domain between perception and meaning. The partage defines 
whose voices ‘count’ and who is relegated to the structural position of the sans-part: 
“it defines what is visible or not in a common space”. (Rancière 2004: 12-13) Since 
Rancière defines the police order as a particular partage, politics, in so far as it 
consists of introducing the supplementary sans-part into the domain of visibility by 
the declaration of the universal principle of equality, has aesthetics at its core.  
The police partage can thus be undone by means of a certain aesthetic politics, 
a progressive art which can activate slippages between ontological categories, and 
puts forward alternative configurations of the visible. In Rancière’s writing, a certain 
work of art will be said to have, or express, a ‘politics’, in that it implies a particular 
vision of how the world should be, that it proposes a particular distribution of the 
sensible. Rancière remains open to the subjective multiplicity of the aesthetic 
encounter in that he gives no single account of how an encounter with an artwork 
can effect this shift. Thus, depending on the particular interpretative formula(e) by 
which an art work is understood within any prevailing police partage, the work of art 
can give rise or not to a progressive reconfiguration of the distribution of the 
sensible. (Rancière 1999: 32) More than simply offering an alternative distribution of 
parts, politically active works of art exploit the tension between a specific act of 
perception and its implicit reliance on preconstituted objects deemed worthy of 
perception, in order to expose the arbitrary basis upon which the prevailing relations 
of domination are constituted. This breaking of the partage is thus correlative to the 
Lacanian ‘traversing the fantasy’, in that it does not imply the subject’s inhabitation of 
an ontological outside, but rather a renegotiation from within.  
His erroneous characterization of Rancière as a partisan of ‘pure politics’ 
notwithstanding, Žižek has advanced a valuable response to Rancière’s political and 
aesthetic theory. (C.f. Žižek 2004a: 73-75, Rancière 2009c: 116, Rancière 1999: 61) 
The key moment in Žižek’s reading of Rancière’s politics is the short-circuit between 
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the Particular and the Universal: “the paradox of a singular which appears as a 
stand-in for the Universal, destabilizing the ‘natural’ functional order of relations in 
the social body”. (Žižek 2004a: 70) The identification of the non-part with the Whole, 
according to Žižek, is the “elementary gesture of politicization, discernable in all 
great democratic events from the French Revolution […] to the demise of ex-
European Socialism”. (Žižek 2008d: 221) Here it is possible to discern the strong 
parallels between this reading, and the ‘concrete universality’ Žižek draws from 
Laclau and Hegel. One can therefore read Rancière’s account of the sans-part’s 
destabilization of the specific partage known as the police order by means of its 
demonstration of the arbitrary basis of its self-constitution as a mechanism of 
undoing of the hegemonic action of Žižek’s ideological Master-Signifier, a 
reformulation of the symbolic coordinates of meaning-making. However, in asserting 
contra Žižek that class struggle is not the motor of politics without providing a viable 
alternative, Rancière fails to explain what drives the sans-part to assert themselves 
as political actors, beyond the implicit and optimistic assertion that the axiomatic 
principle of equality will inevitably assert itself. (Rancière 1999: 18) Rancière 
neglects the processes by which politics is reabsorbed into a police order which they 
reconfigure, and is blind to one of the most fundamental obstacles to emancipatory 
politics: the desire of people to be policed. Žižek’s insistence on the governance of 
enjoyment as the means by which an ideology conditions its subjects to consent is a 
powerful solution to this problem. Although Rancière’s early historical work indicates 
that he is not blind to the political importance of enjoyment, Žižek is correct to point 
out that Rancière’s hesitance to avail himself of the lessons of psychoanalysis 
means his later understandings of mechanisms of domination, and the motor of 
emancipation, are necessarily limited.9  
Žižek’s unwillingness to accept Rancière’s fundamental point regarding the 
multidirectional and constitutionally intertwined character of the relations between 
emancipatory politics, orders of domination, and aesthetics, is at odds with his own 
insistence that ideology functions, in part, to control the horizons of visibility in 
symbolic space. (Žižek 2009c: 418) It is also at the root of the problems, identified by 
Judith Butler, his theory of ideology encounters when attempting to explain the 
cultural domain as anything but mere epiphenomena. The key point to be drawn 
from Rancière, therefore, is that any particular ideology necessarily exercises a 
degree of control over the domain of sense-perception and its relations to meaning, 
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and can be understood as a specific partage. Therefore, the aesthetic must be 
understood as more than the ground for ideology-critique, but the very ground of 
ideology’s symbolic operation. Rancière’s refusal to provide an ontological basis for 
his theoretical interventions provides a healthy counterpoint to Žižek’s reliance on 
an, admittedly minimal, ahistorical formal framework. Following Butler’s insistence 
that the unconscious is the domain of the ‘unspeakably social’, and Rancière’s 
assertions that the police partage is the ‘symbolic constitution of the social’ 
(correlative in this respect to the symbolic level of ideology identified by Žižek) and 
that political emancipation emerges at the moment of its reconfiguration, one must 
remain attentive to the historically contingent character specific ideological fantasies 
assume, their relationship to the relations between aesthetic visibility and meaning, 
and open to the possibly for artistic practice to engineer a reorientation of the 
(viewing) subject’s conscious and unconscious relationship to a particular ideology.  
 
Conclusion 
Žižek’s continuing and prodigious output ensures that his thought is always evolving 
and resistant to any straightforward or static systemization. Again, much like 
Rancière, who explicitly rejects any notion that he is crafting a philosophical system 
and instead conceptualizes his work as ‘interventions’ into various discourses and 
traditions, Žižek’s thinking is most powerfully utilized as a critical language that can 
be brought to bear upon specific problems. Making use of the insights of Žižekian 
ideology critique within the realm of art history, as we have seen, however creates 
moments of tension that must be resolved: namely, the incompatibility in how the 
directionality and character of art’s relationship to ideology is conceived; and in how 
Žižek’s primarily synchronic formalism relates to the diachronic, historical demands 
of art history. I have argued that, each at specific moments, the critical interventions 
of Judith Butler and Jacques Rancière offer the means to resolve these tensions and 
reconcile the seeming split in the phrase ‘Žižekian art history’.  
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Notes 
1 In 2004 Matthew Sharpe commented upon the “comparative dearth of secondary material 
on Žižek”, especially in relation to Žižek’s own prodigious output. (Sharpe 2004: 16) The 
International Journal of Žižek Studies, launched in 2007, is going some way to correct this, 
as is the increase in number of critical introductions to Žižek, and the publication in 2014 of a 
Žižek dictionary edited by the art historian and Žižek scholar Rex Butler. (Parker 2004, 
Pound 2008, Khader and Rothenberg 2013, Vighi and Feldner 2007, Butler 2014) 
2 See also his critique of the art journal October, which, in his view, only tenuously justifies 
its (implicitly useless in political terms) “jargonistic analyses of modern art” by a reference to 
“that October […], the radical revolutionary past”. (Žižek 2002: 172) 
3 “[W]e should be especially careful not to confuse the ruling ideology with ideology which 
seems to dominate. More than ever, we should bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s reminder 
that it is no enough to ask how a certain theory (or art) positions itself with regard to social 
struggles—we should also ask how it actually functions in these very struggles”. (Žižek 2002: 
169) 
4 Such an understanding of class bears an obvious relation of Lacan’s theory of sexual 
difference, that is, that one’s sexual position is defined by one’s relation (having/being) to the 
phallus and is thus functional within the Symbolic. However, as there is no signifier of sexual 
difference as such, the subject’s inhabitation of a sexual position is always precarious and, 
as such, there can be no harmonious sexual relationship. See, (Lacan 1997: 170, 177, 
Lacan 1999: 35, 78-81, Lacan 1991: 263) 
5 For more on Žižek’s deployment of this Rancièrean notion, see below. 
6 “The specificity of the psyche does not imply its autonomy [from the social]” (Butler 2000: 
154) 
7 C.f. “One can this categorically assert that existence of ideology qua generative matrix that 
regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible”. (Žižek 1994: 1) 
8 The principle of equality is the central and explicit kernel of Rancière’s œuvre. Rancière 
developed his notion of equality after an engagement with the radical pedagogy of Joseph 
Jacotot, elucidated in his Le Maître ignorant: Cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle. 
(Rancière 1991) For Ranciere, equality is “a universal that must be supposed, verified, and 
demonstrated in each case”, but one that “only takes effect in a singularized form”. (Rancière 
1992: 60, Rancière and Rockhill 2004: 52) As such, it is not a founding ontological principle: 
Rancière’s equality is active and declarative, it is not conferred upon people, but rather 
created by them. Rancière terms the communal coming into being of political subjects which 
occurs within politics ‘political subjectification’. In ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’ 
Rancière argued that political subjects can adhere to an identity configuration only ‘between’ 
existing ones, in a fissure opened up by the disruptive consequences of politics, and 
enabled by an ‘impossible identification’. (Rancière 1992: 61) By the time of La Mésentente 
Rancière had come to view subjectification as the transformation of existing identities. 
(Rancière 1999: 35-36) 
9 In an essay on The People’s Theatre published in the journal Les Revoltes Logiques, 
Rancière correctly identified that “[t]o moralize meant creating manners. But manners are not 
created by lessons, rather by identification and imitation, in other words by learning a certain 
jouissance. And they only take hold of the social body insofar as they are held in common. 
To moralize the people thus meant providing them with some enjoyment in common with the 
aristocratic classes”. (Rancière 2012: 4) The argument that Rancière is too rationalistic and 
fails to adequately account for the affective dimensions of politics and of the aesthetic has 
been advanced by other scholars including Oliver Davis and Joseph Tanke. (Davis 2010: 97, 
Tanke 2013: 124) 
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